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1. Introduction     
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) are set to become part of everyday air traffic operations 
perhaps within the next few years; however there are significant challenges that need to be 
addressed in order to seamlessly introduce UAS into non segregated airspace. This chapter 
discusses some of the identified safety challenges in achieving this objective in the context of 
the current regulatory framework.  It also takes a look at how one might rigorously argue 
the safety of UAS operations in non-segregated airspace from an Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) perspective. The chapter draws upon the experience of the authors’ in the UAS 
domain, more specifically the lessons learnt from a number of safety assessments for flying 
UAS as Operational or General Air Traffic (OAT or GAT) inside and outside segregated 
airspace. 
Most UAS operations are currently constrained to designated danger areas or within 
temporary restricted areas of airspace, commonly known as segregated airspace, or are 
flown under special arrangements over the sea. On some occasions, UAS operations are 
permitted in an extremely limited environment outside segregated airspace.  To exploit fully 
the unique operational capabilities of current and future UAS and thus realise the potential 
commercial benefits of UAS, there is a desire to be able to access all classes of airspace and 
operate across national borders and airspace boundaries.  Such operations must be 
acceptably safe but regulation should not become so inflexible or burdensome that the 
commercial benefits are lost. 
The viability of the commercial market for UAS especially in the civil market is heavily 
dependent on unfettered access to the same airspace as manned civilian operations. Whilst it 
is essential that UAS demonstrate an equivalent level of safety compared to manned 
operations the current regulatory framework has evolved around the concept of the pilot-in-
the-cockpit.  There is a need to develop UAS solutions that assure an equivalent level of 
safety for UAS operations, which in turn will require adaptation of the current regulatory 
framework to allow for the concept of the pilot-not-in-the-cockpit without compromising 
the safety of other airspace users.   
One of the major issues facing UAS operations is the demonstration of equivalence (in 
particular for See and Avoid) in the context of an evolving ATM environment.  It is very 
important to understand that the current ATM environment is not static.  Achieving 
equivalence with manned operations is not a fixed target as there are many significant 
changes proposed that aim to improve operational efficiency and performance or enhance 
safety.  On the whole proposed changes to the ATM environment could be seen as 
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advantageous to UAS operations as more and more functions within the environment are 
automated thus there is a significant opportunity for the UAS industry to influence the 
shape of the future ATM environment to support wider UAS operations. 
Assuring the safety of UAS operations in non-segregated airspace will therefore require a 
significant update to key elements of extant regulations and standards.  UAS have yet to 
establish a good safety record1 and there are many challenges both regulatory and 
technological to be resolved before such operations can become common place.  Without a 
coherent regulatory framework (i.e. regulations, standards, etc.) for certifying UAS such 
systems must be argued as acceptably safe within the context of the whole operational Air 
Traffic environment2.  However, regulators are taking steps towards providing this 
infrastructure.  Wider and more detailed regulations and standards will likely form around 
the technologies that become available to resolve the operational and safety issues that UAS 
operations must address. 
2. Current Regulatory Framework 
2.1 Overview 
The regulatory context for UAS operations in non-segregated airspace can be split into three 
main considerations; certification of air vehicle airworthiness, safe provision of air traffic 
services and licensing of operators, pilots, etc.   Most of the regulatory work carried out to 
date has focussed on airworthiness certification as well as the licensing of UAS Pilots.  There 
is also a need for regulation to include the Air Traffic Management environment and for the 
co-ordination of all regulatory activities, a point noted by EASA in a recent regulatory 
consultation paper (EASA A-NPA, 2005) to ensure the safety of air travel as a whole. 
However, the regulatory framework is changing rapidly especially with respect to 
integration of UAS into the air traffic management environment, (Degamo, 2004) suggests 
that whilst the United States leads in UAS technology developments, they apparently lag 
behind the UK and Europe in legislative activities relating to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs), more specifically they currently have no regulation or guidance for UAS 
operations; (Degamo, 2004) also provides a good background on UAS issues in general.   
2.2 UK Regulations  
(CAP722, 2008) provides guidance for UAS operations in UK airspace and has been 
compiled by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Directorate of Airspace Policy (DAP) to 
cater for the growing capabilities and anticipated increase of pilotless aerial vehicles. 
(CAP722, 2008) details the overarching military and civil regulations applicable to UK UAS 
operation. 
In addition, civil certification aspects of UAS are the responsibility of the Design and 
Production Standards Division of the CAA Safety Regulation Group (SRG).  Their position 
set out within (Hatton & Whittaker, 2002) is that UAS should be granted permission to fly 
                                                                 
1 The current UAV accident rate is 100 times that of manned aircraft.  According to US Air Force studies 
(Degammo, 2004)  the accident rate is 50 times greater than for F-16, US commercial aircraft accident 
rate is 0.06 per million flight hours compared to Global Hawk at 1,600 per million flight hours; very few 
of these accidents resulted in third party losses. 
2 When a UAS Sense and Avoid specification is defined within the regulatory framework then it would 
be sufficient to certify such systems against this specification. 
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by qualifying for Certificates of Airworthiness by demonstrating compliance with defined 
airworthiness standards comparable to, and derived from, those applied to manned aircraft.  
The principles of the UK Policy for UAS are as follows: 
• To operate within existing arrangements and regulations for air traffic 
• No automatic right of airspace use 
• An equivalent level of certification compliance 
• No increased risk to existing users 
• Operations must be “transparent”3  to the controller 
• Currently flights outside Danger Areas will be in temporary segregated airspace 
In addition to the later point rules apply for operations in non-segregated airspace, 
including carriage of mandated equipment as per manned aircraft and provision of an 
acceptable sense and avoid system.  Other important considerations include UAS control 
link reliability and security. 
2.3 European Regulations 
Several European agencies are engaged in activities aimed at the development of rules that 
can accommodate the Joint Aviation Requirements (JARs) and satisfy member nations’ 
concerns over UAS safety and usage.  
Prior to the formation of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Joint Aviation 
Authorities (JAA) was an associated body of the European Civil Aviation Conference 
(ECAC) representing the civil aviation regulatory authorities of a number of European 
States who agreed to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory 
standards and procedures.  One of the JAAs key functions was to develop and adopt Joint 
Aviation Requirements (JARs) in the fields of aircraft design and manufacture, aircraft 
operations and maintenance, and the licensing of aviation personnel.  JARs applicable to 
UAS operations include (JAR 23, 1994 et al). 
A Joint JAA/EUROCONTROL initiative on UAS (known as the UAV Task-Force) was 
established in September 2002 on the basis of a joint decision of the JAA and 
EUROCONTROL governing bodies. This decision was taken in reaction to the growing 
European UAS Industry and the recognised need for the authorities to commence work 
leading to European regulations for civil UAS. The non-existence of such regulations was 
seen as a major obstacle for further development of European UAS applications.  The 
findings of the Final Report of the UAV-Task Force are documented in 
(JAA/EUROCONTROL, 2004).  
Due to the significant interest in UAS operations shown by EASA, EUROCONTROL, the 
European Union and other National Organisations, the European Organisation for Civil 
Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) set up a Working Group (WG-73 Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles) to establish required recommendations and technical standards for UAS.  The 
main objective of WG-73, as set out in (EUROCAE, 2006), is to ensure that UAS can operate 
safely within the airspace and are compatible with existing infrastructure and related 
systems and equipments.   
                                                                 
3 As defined by (CAP722, 2008) “A controller must not be expected to do anything different using Radio 
Telephony or landlines than he would for other aircraft under his control. Nor should he have to apply 
different rules or work to different criteria. UAS must be able to comply with instructions and with 
equipment requirements applicable to the class of airspace within which they intend to operate.” 
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2.4 Future Air Traffic Management Environment 
It is very important to understand that the air traffic regulatory framework is not static and 
achieving equivalence with manned operations is not a fixed target.  The air traffic 
environment is constantly subject to changes that aim to improve operational efficiency, 
interoperability, performance, functionality or enhance safety.  The technical changes 
proposed on the whole could be seen as advantageous to UAS operations as more and more 
functions within the environment are automated.  There is a significant opportunity for the 
UAS industry to influence the shape of the future air traffic environment to support wider 
UAS operations.  There is also clear evidence that UAS operations are being considered 
within the scope of some of these changes.  
The most comprehensive package of changes proposed over the next 12 years or so is 
captured by the Single European Sky ATM Research or SESAR programme.  The conceptual 
changes proposed by SESAR for the ATM environment are summarised in the ATM Target 
Concept (SESAR D3, 2007).  There are many proposed changes, too many to describe here, 
but some may even affect the fundamental concepts in air traffic service provision.  The 
most significant of these are: 
• Simplification of the classification of airspace into managed and unmanaged, although 
managed airspace will also include high-density areas (e.g. around airports), dynamic 
and variable airspace reservations (known as “Moving ARES”) and delegated 
separation provision arrangements. 
• Introduction of co-operative separation provision and self separation provision modes 
in controlled airspace based on Airborne Separation Assistance Systems (ASAS) 
applications. 
• Greater deconfliction capabilities, with less reliance on Controllers, allowing the use of 
Precision Trajectory Clearances, combined with automated trajectory control by speed 
adjustment. 
• Development of Collision Avoidance systems to take into account the changes to 
separation provision modes highlighted above.  Enhancements to Airborne Collision 
Avoidance System (ACAS) and Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) are expected to take 
advantage of the availability of more detailed aircraft information and the sharing of 
information between ground and airborne surveillance systems. 
The deployment timeline for the SESAR changes is documented in the ATM Deployment 
Sequence (SESAR D4, 2008). It should be noted that all of these ideas are still in research and 
the case for safety has yet to be made. 
3. Operations in Non-Segregated Airspace  
UAS operations need to be acceptably safe irrespective of the type of airspace where 
unmanned air vehicles are flown. UAS operations in designated areas of airspace, from 
which other air users are excluded, however, can significantly simplify4 the problem of 
justifying that an acceptable level of safety is achieved.  The justification becomes more 
complex when the air vehicle ventures into airspace shared with others, known as non-
segregated airspace. The fundamental difference is that in segregated airspace the “system” 
in which the UAS operates can be bounded, controlled and is often unique to the UAS.  In 
                                                                 
4 Notwithstanding that levels of airworthiness and pilot competence still need to be assured for the 
UAS, i.e. the air vehicle, its control system and its pilot in command. 
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non-segregated airspace the UAS must integrate with an air traffic environment developed 
over decades to support manned aircraft.   
To add to the complexity, non-segregated airspace is further classified into seven types; 
from Class A to Class G, as currently defined by (ICAO Annex 2, 1990) although this may 
change in the future as part of the Single European Sky initiative.  This means that in 
addition to baseline airworthiness certification, UAS must demonstrate that they: 
• Will not undermine the safety of the provision of those services to the UAS or other air 
users. 
• Meet the rules of the air applicable to the meteorological conditions and class of airspace. 
Specifically this would include for example: 
• Meeting the mandatory equipment requirements for the class of airspace to be flown in 
(known as Minimum Aviation Specification Performance)5 
• Interfacing with the existing air traffic services provided in that airspace (eg full air 
traffic control, flight information service, radar advisory service, etc.) 
(ICAO ATM Operational Concept Document, 2003) identifies three main components of Air 
Traffic Management; Strategic Conflict Management, Separation Provision and Collision 
Avoidance.  Strategic Conflict Management encapsulates all pre-flight planning activities 
that take place to ensure demand, capacity and conflicts are managed prior to the real time 
situation.  The Strategic Conflict Management component includes pre-flight processes such 
as airspace / procedure design and flight plan management. It is anticipated that this 
component will be implemented the same for manned and unmanned operations. A 
functional representation of the 3 components is shown in ig 1 below.  The concept of See 
and Avoid covers both separation provision and collision avoidance and is discussed below 
as it represents one of the most challenging aspects of UAS operations. 
 
Figure 1. High-level Air Traffic Service Functional Model 
                                                                 
5 The amount of equipment implied could be well in excess of the weight limits for the air vehicle and 
this may be one of the major limitations on the type of air vehicle than can use non-segregated airspace. 
www.intechopen.com
Aerial Vehicles 
 
642 
3.1 Separation Provision 
Separation provision is the tactical process of keeping aircraft away from other airspace 
users and obstacles by at least the appropriate separation minimum.  Depending upon the 
type of airspace and, where applicable, the air traffic service being provided, separation 
provision can be performed by air traffic controllers or by the pilot-in-command.  Where a 
controller is responsible for providing separation provision, the Separation Provision 
Monitoring and Demand for an aircraft are provided by the controller and the pilot is 
responsible for Trajectory Compliance.  Where the pilot is responsible for Separation 
Provision, all these functions are performed by the pilot in accordance with the Rules of the 
Air. 
Under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) in certain types of airspace, there is currently no specified 
minimum separation distance and the pilot of, for example, a manned aircraft arranges his 
trajectory using airborne radar and/or visual means to separate his flight path from other 
air users. In these scenarios for UAS operations (EUROCONTROL UAV-TF, 2007) defines a 
minimum separation distance of 0.5nm horizontally and 500ft vertically.  The term 
Separation Provision should therefore be taken to include the actions necessary to provide 
physical separation between a UAS air vehicle and other air users of at least 0.5nm or 500ft, 
even though no separation minima is currently defined for manned operations. 
3.2 Collision Avoidance 
The Collision Avoidance component can be separated into pilot and collision avoidance 
system functions.  Manned aircraft may be fitted with collision avoidance systems such as 
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II or elements thereof such as 
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) Transponders6. Collision avoidance systems are 
designed to activate when separation provision has been compromised; although air traffic 
controllers can instigate collision avoidance action from a pilot, this mechanism would not 
be available to an autonomous UAS.   
(SRC Policy Document 2, 2003) states that collision avoidance systems (referred to as Safety 
Nets) are not part of separation provision so must not be included in determining the 
acceptable level of safety required for separation provision. However, the collision 
avoidance performed by a pilot of a manned aircraft must be performed to an equivalent 
level of safety by the UAS whether piloted or autonomous. 
The Safety Regulation Commission (SRC) Policy statement implies that UAS must provide 
an equivalent level of interaction with the Separation Provision component as provided by 
pilots.  Furthermore the UAS separation provision system must maintain the level of safety 
(with respect to the scope of (ESARR 4, 2001)) without the need for a Safety Net. This 
implies that UAS need to provide independence between separation provision and collision 
avoidance systems.  
3.3 See and Avoid 
Current manned operations include provisions for pilot “See and Avoid” to implement (or 
augment depending on the class of airspace) the separation provision and collision 
avoidance functions. UAS operations need to provide an equivalent level of safety with a 
                                                                 
6 Mode A/C and S Transponders can be used by other aircraft fitted with TCAS. 
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“Sense and Avoid” capability to overcome the loss of manned “See and Avoid” capability7. 
However, it is important that separation provision and collision avoidance are addressed 
independently.  
Firstly, if the Separation Provision component is working normally then the Collision 
Avoidance component is not under demand.  Therefore in this environment the Collision 
Avoidance component should only provide situational awareness information8.  Secondly, if 
Separation Provision fails in some way then the normal operation for the Collision 
Avoidance component is to act to avoid any imminent potential collisions.  For this to work 
successfully a number of conditions must be satisfied; as a minimum the components 
should do as shown in Table 1. 
Function 
Collision 
Avoidance 
Separation 
Provision 
Be aware of all traffic in the vicinity 9 9 
Implement and maintain appropriate separation minima 
with all other traffic 
 9 
Have criteria for when to implement traffic warnings 
(separation provision is potentially about to fail) and 
resolution warnings (separation has failed and immediate 
collision avoidance action is required) 
9  
Be able to identify traffic that is a collision (or near miss) 
threat, establish an appropriate avoidance response, taking 
into account other potential targets, and implement the 
response if the UAS pilot is unable to do so in time 
9  
Table 1. Sense and Avoid conditions 
In addition since the UAS must integrate with the existing manned aircraft environment it 
must operate with extant co-operative and non-co-operative systems for surveillance and 
collision avoidance, inter alia:  
• Other traffic must be able to ‘see’ the UAS air vehicle under all the conditions that other 
manned aircraft would be detected by another manned aircraft.  
• Non-co-operative surveillance systems (e.g. Primary Surveillance Radar) must be able 
to ‘see’ the air vehicle. 
• To cater for all potential air traffic scenarios a UAS Sense and Avoid system must be 
able to detect co-operative traffic (aircraft fitted with data link devices, e.g. Mode S 
transponders) and non-co-operative traffic (unfitted).  
3.4 UAS Characteristics 
The UAS encapsulates not only the air vehicle itself, but the entirety of equipment, people 
and procedures involved in the launch, control and recovery of the air vehicles.  To establish 
                                                                 
7 Sense and Avoid capability should address many of the issues associated with pilot-not-in-the-cockpit, 
however, consideration also needs to be given to inter alia, emergency responses and off-tether 
operations, etc. 
8 This should not be taken to imply that the Collision Avoidance component must not be active, only 
that whilst the Separation Provision component is working correctly then the Collision Avoidance 
component should not interfere. 
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the potential differences in manned and unmanned operations, it is important to understand 
the specific characteristics of UAS that are potentially applicable to UAS operations.   
A principle characteristic is physical separation of control of the air vehicle from the air 
vehicle itself.  The UAS pilot will be remote from the UAV either on the ground or in 
another aircraft.  The UAS pilot maintains control of the air vehicle through a UAS Control 
System via a UAS Control Link.  The operation of the control link cannot be guaranteed 
under all conditions so the UAS must be able to work safely with or without the control link; 
this is referred to as flying on or off-tether. 
The key characteristics that can affect UAS operations are as follows: 
• Conspicuity – the visibility of the air vehicle to other airspace users is an important 
component in the Collision Avoidance component as well as when Separation 
Provision is the responsibility of the UAS pilot.  This could be an issue for air vehicles 
that are smaller than manned aircraft, or those that present a poor signature for Primary 
Surveillance Radar. 
• Autonomous Operations – One of the key characteristics of UAS’s is the ability to 
operate under various conditions without human interaction. The necessity for human 
interaction, along with other factors such as safety, mission complexity and 
environmental difficulty determine the level of autonomy that the UAS can achieve. 
There are various taxonomies for classifying UAS autonomy for example Autonomy 
Levels For Unmanned Systems (Hui-Min Huangi, et al, 2005). However, it is not 
possible to define UAS operation in non-segregated airspace under any one 
classification as UAS may be expected to operate with varying degrees of autonomy 
depending on the circumstances. 
• Airworthiness – UAS air vehicles (and as applicable control stations) must be fitted 
with certified equipment equivalent to that required for manned operation in the 
intended airspace; this may pose problems for smaller or lighter air vehicles due to 
space or weight constraints. 
• Flight Performance – the manoeuvrability of a UAS air vehicle is important to 
understand.  Currently, Air Traffic Controllers are required to understand flight 
performance characteristics of the types of aircraft that come under their control and 
provide separation provision instructions based on this understanding.  This 
requirement for understanding will also need to apply to unmanned operations to 
ensure ATC instructions can be implemented. 
4. A Definition of Acceptably Safe 
(JAA/EUROCONTROL, 2004) defines acceptably safe in terms of achieving an equivalent 
level of risk with that for manned aircraft. 
• UAV Operations shall not increase the risk to other airspace users or third parties 
This definition rightly focuses on the equivalence in risk and not safety levels, regulation or 
certification9 and cuts across the current debate on the certification versus safety target 
approach to assuring UAS safety, as discussed in (Haddon & Whittaker, 2002) and (EASA 
A-NPA, 2005).   
                                                                 
9 Achieving equivalence with manned aircraft through regulation/certification alone may be 
inadequate or overly prescriptive unless the impact on the risk is fully assessed. 
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However, it does rely on a fundamental assumption that current manned operations are 
acceptably safe and does lack the level of detail required to appreciate some of the issues 
facing UAS operations in non-segregated airspace, which include: 
a. The level of acceptable risk for manned aircraft operations varies depending on the 
operational context. 
b. The public perception of the UAS risk may demand a harsher consideration of risk than 
for manned operations. 
c. In accordance with European ATM legislation (ESARR 3, 2000), the risk should also be 
reduced as far as reasonably practicable (AFARP). 
In addition, levels of air traffic are predicted and expected to increase over the next few 
decades, which will also require an increasing level of safety.  There is a significant 
demand10 to make improvements to the existing Air Traffic environment to achieve this, and 
the opportunity that UAS technology11 may provide to support this should not be ignored 
or overlooked.  
4.1 Public Perception of UAV Risk 
One of the key influences that will determine the direction and strength of the UAS market 
is acceptance by the general public.  It is well understood that any public trust and support 
for UAS operations that exists today will evaporate as soon as a UAS air vehicle is involved 
in an accident, regardless of fault. 
A public opinion survey undertaken in the United States in 2003, the findings of which are 
documented in (MacSween-George & Lynn, 2003), found that up to 68% of the public 
support cargo and commercial UAS applications and most were not concerned by UAS 
flying overhead.  However, the survey also found that the majority of respondents would 
not support the use of UAS to fly passengers.  
The CAA Directorate of Airspace Policy recently invited members of the UK aviation 
industry to attend a one day workshop (CAA, 2005) to discuss UAS matters and the effect 
that emerging systems may have on existing and future manned aviation activity.  One of 
the syndicate sessions at this workshop was tasked with discussing public and aviation 
industry perceptions, the following issues were identified: 
• Potential negative public perception due to lack of knowledge or concerns over UAS 
historical safety records. 
• Perception from the current manned community in terms of lack of trust in shared 
airspace. 
• Public concern on the safety and security implications of UAS. 
• Lack of trust in the regulation of industry. 
It is vitally important therefore to secure public acceptance via positive promotion of the 
capabilities, limitations and safety of UAS by active communication with all affected 
stakeholders.  
                                                                 
10 Under European Airspace Regulation, ANSPs are required to reduce risk As Far As Reasonably 
Practicable (ESARR 3, 2000). 
11 Or combining UAS and next generation manned technology. 
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4.2 A Practical Safety Criteria 
From a safety perspective it is clear that the aim of the UAS industry, regulators and 
operators must be to ensure that the safety risk from UAS operations in non-segregated 
airspace shall be: 
• No greater than for manned operations in the same operational context12 
• Further reduced As Far As Reasonably Practicable 
This supports the view proposed by Air Commodore Taylor as documented in (Taylor, 
2005) but also takes into account the counter view expressed by (DeGarmo, 2004) and 
alluded to within (CAP72, 2008) by encouraging rather than mandating enhanced safety 
over and above manned operations. This is the basis on which (EUROCONTROL UAV-TF, 
2007) was assessed in order to determine the safety requirements for such operations. 
5. Safety Argument for UAS Operation in Non-segregated Airspace 
The purpose of the safety argument presented below is to outline how the overall objective 
of “equivalent risk” can be broken down in relation to UAS operations in non-segregated 
airspace to a level where regulations can be defined that ensure that the resultant risk is 
acceptable in principle.  In describing the safety argument some of the key issues and 
challenges facing the domain are described.  Note that the safety argument is not specific to 
a type or class of air vehicle but rather to the concept of UAS operations in non-segregated 
airspace. This approach facilitates identification of specifications that are rigorous but avoid 
being implementation specific. 
5.1 Top-level Safety Argument (Claim 0) 
The overall objective for assuring that UAS operations will be safe is to show that they are 
and will continue to be acceptably safe (as defined in the previous section) within a clearly 
defined context.  The context must include: 
• Justification for the intended operational use. 
• A definition of the operational scenarios (both mission and air traffic service related) 
that a UAS may face. 
• Necessary assumptions (e.g. that current equivalent manned operations are acceptably 
safe). 
Of necessity the argument must also consider all potential operational phases.  An example 
scenario model for the latter phase of flight is shown in the Fig 3 below. 
                                                                 
12 This is a relative approach to assess risk.  Within the air traffic management domain absolute safety 
targets are set for Air Traffic Service Providers in (ESARR 4, 2001) but the relative approach is still 
applied to manned operations although this will likely change over time.  At some point in the future 
(sooner for some applications such as Area Navigation) UAS operations will also need to be compliant. 
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Figure 3. Example Scenario Model (1) 
This top level goal can be shown to be met by demonstrating four principle safety goals: 
1. Safety requirements are specified such that the safety criteria as discussed in section 4.2 
is satisfied in principle. 
2. Safety requirements are fully addressed in the relevant regulations and standards. 
3. Safety requirements are developed at a level commensurate with the level of detail in 
regulations or standards. 
4. UAS operations in non-segregated airspace fully satisfy the safety requirements within 
the regulations and standards in practice. 
5. UAS operations in non-segregated airspace are monitored to ensure that the safety 
criteria continue to be satisfied in operation. 
These principle goals are discussed in the following sections. 
5.2 Safety Requirements for UAS Operations (Claim 1) 
Safety requirements can be developed at almost any level of abstraction.  For the purpose of 
setting regulation or standard specifications safety requirements need to reflect the level of 
detail determined by the scope and purpose of the regulation or standard.  In turn the safety 
requirements need to be: 
• Developed at a high-level but form a necessarily and sufficiently complete set to show 
the safety criteria are met. 
• Based on validated models of UAS operation. 
• Derived using an appropriate safety assessment methodology to include functional 
safety properties as well as integrity requirements. 
• Realisable in implementation, although consideration as to whether the requirements 
are capable of implementation should not be limited by the capabilities of current UAS 
technology. 
The safety requirements derived for (EUROCONTROL UAV-TF, 2007) were based on 
slightly more detailed models of UAS operations than those described in section 2.  The 
principle conclusions of this work were: 
www.intechopen.com
Aerial Vehicles 
 
648 
• Despite the variety of airspace classifications, available ATM services, the multitude of 
possible scenarios and the different phases of flight etc. only three modes of operation 
needed to be considered, as follows: 
• Where ATC is responsible for separation provision. 
• Where the pilot in command is responsible for separation provision. 
• Where the air vehicle is not in contact with the pilot in command and so provides 
separation provision for itself. 
• At the air traffic management functional safety level no distinction was drawn between 
manned and UAS operations, i.e. UAS operations do not introduce new hazards to the 
domain. 
• Given the need for further research it was considered necessary to mandate that UAS 
pilots in command will require equivalent piloting skills to those of manned aircraft 
when flying in non-segregated airspace.  However, this would be inadequate where 
pilots in command are responsible for more than one UAS at a time. 
• Issues with requirements achievability were identified and are discussed further within 
section 5.4 below. 
(SRC Policy Document 1, 2001) specifies a Target Level of Safety (TLS) for civil aircraft 
which is further apportioned within European ATM Regulation (ESARR 4, 2001) to ATM 
specific risks. These safety targets should be further apportioned by airspace users, Air 
Navigation Service Providers, etc. in order to set targets for specific operations. As this is 
often seen as too complex a task, many safety cases for European air traffic management 
concepts and systems rely on a relative argument, although not all, e.g. (EUROCONTROL 
RNAV, 2004), etc. In these cases UAS operations should demonstrate compliance with the 
specific defined absolute targets and safety requirements. 
5.3 UAV Regulations and Standards (Claim 2) 
Whilst there is a need for specific UAS regulations and standards for particular UAS 
technologies much of the regulations and specifications for non-segregated airspace 
operations already exist within the manned aircraft and air traffic regulations as outlined in 
section 2.2.   
These provide a vital basis as advocated by (Haddon & Whittaker, 2002) for the creation of 
UAS specific regulations and standards. But regulations and standards need to be 
developed in accordance with derived safety requirements and not just based on the concept 
of “equivalence”.   The safety assessment work carried out for (EUROCONTROL UAV-TF, 
2006) can be seen as a model for the development of other UAS regulations and standards to 
ensure that the overall objective of “equivalent risk” is achieved. 
There is a need for regulations and standards to be developed in the context of commonly 
agreed safety requirements based on a whole “system of systems” model of UAS operations 
to ensure that each perspective is fully considered including pilots, industry, Air Traffic 
Controllers, Operators, Maintainers and regulators.  It is of particular concern that at the 
moment UAS security is not clearly covered by any regulatory authority, yet ensuring and 
maintaining the security of control centres, data links, etc. is fundamental to the 
substantiation that operations are acceptably safety. 
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5.4 UAS Safety Requirements Implementation (Claim 3) 
The principle conclusions with regards the implementation of safety requirements for UAS 
operations in non-segregated airspace are as follows: 
• There needs to be independence between the implementation of the separation 
provision (strategic) and the implementation of collision avoidance (tactical separation 
provision).   
• This is easier to achieve when an air traffic controller is responsible for separation 
provision and the pilot in command can control the air vehicle and is aware of other air 
users (see next bullet), since the air vehicle can be fitted with a collision avoidance 
system similar to TCAS II.  However, there are unresolved concerns regarding the 
efficacy of TCAS II logic and UAS operations13 and the level of risk reduction achieved 
by TCAS II, approximately 30% (EUROCONTROL ACAS, 2005) may be insufficient to 
achieve an equivalent level of risk. 
• There are still some uncertainties with implementation of automated strategic and 
tactical separation provision systems to replace that currently performed by the pilot14, 
i.e. the “Sense and Avoid” issue. 
• The safety assessment conducted on the (EUROCONTROL UAV-TF, 2007) concluded 
that UAS sense and avoid technology offers the potential to improve threat detection 
and avoidance capability, especially given concerns with the effectiveness of human see 
and avoid capabilities.  Achieving equivalence or even equivalent risk seems 
inadequate in this case. A comprehensive discussion of the issues is provided in 
(DeGarmo, 2004). 
• UAV and Data Link reliability are key to minimising the workload impact on air traffic 
controllers arising from excessive instigation of emergency or contingency procedures. 
• UAS operations must consider the scenario when the communication between the pilot 
in command and the air vehicle is unavailable.  In this scenario the air vehicle must 
conform to a predefined flight plan so that UAS behaviour remains as deterministic as 
possible15.   
• Emergency Procedures may necessarily be different for UAS operations and as such 
UAS will need to be able to, for example, indicate when UAS are operating in isolation 
from the pilot in command (e.g. a unique transponder code), when to be provided 
increased separation provision, etc. 
• For most of the risks identified no additional risk mitigation was identified within the 
air traffic domain that could further reduce the risk over and above manned operation.  
This leaves the challenge of achieving the AFARP safety criteria to the standards bodies 
and UAS implementers. 
• There are other challenges that will arise during the implementation of the safety 
requirements, inter alia: 
                                                                 
13 Due for example to the significant reliance on the timeliness of pilot response to Resolution 
Advisories (RA), but such concerns need to be resolved in order to ensure that TCAS II is still working 
as effectively in single and multiple manned vs. UAS air vehicle encounters. 
14 JAR 91.113 Rights of Way Rules state that “regardless of whether an operation is conducted under 
instrumented flight rules (IFR) or visual flight rules (VFR), vigilance shall be maintained by each person 
operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft”. 
15 ATCO‘s consulted during the safety assessment suggested that errant UAS behaviour is probably no 
worse than manned military errant behaviour. 
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• The inadequacy of the current integrity of aeronautical data for terrain maps, 
obstacle heights GPS based navigation systems, etc. although this is being 
addressed through the European Commission Interoperability Mandates. 
• Operating characteristics of current and future UAS air vehicles that may 
undermine principle safety assumptions in current safety cases for air traffic 
operations or concepts, e.g. the timeliness of pilot/UAS implementation of 
controller instructions. 
5.5 Monitoring UAS Operations (Claim 4) 
A programme of safety monitoring and improvement will need to be implemented by state 
regulators and other international bodies to ensure that UAS operations in non-segregated 
airspace remain acceptably safe.  The safety assessment for (EUROCONTROL UAV-TF, 
2007) did not identify any monitoring requirements in addition to those already 
recommended for manned OAT operations.   
6. Conclusions 
There is clearly a desire in industry to produce commercially viable UAS and concern that 
UAS regulations do not become over burdensome or inflexible.  Whilst there is a wealth of 
existing regulation and standards for manned operations, there is still a need to ensure that 
the transition to UAS operations in non-segregated airspace does not jeopardise the safety of 
other airspace users, and perhaps even contributes to an improved level of safety in 
aviation, directly addressing issues with the public perception of the risk from UAS. 
The work for EUROCONTROL DG/MIL has shown that the development and specification 
of regulations and standards can be subject to safety assessment, which can assure the 
completeness and correctness of the specifications whilst providing the rigorous evidence 
that the regulations and standards capture the safety requirements relevant to the their 
scope and purpose.   
By applying this process at all levels of UAS regulation and standard setting it would be 
possible to ensure not only a cohesive approach to UAS regulation but also that UAS 
operations will not increase the risk to other airspace users and third parties.  There is an 
accepted and recognised need for regulatory bodies to work together to ensure that all 
aspects of UAS regulation including Air Traffic Management, Vehicle Certification, 
Operation, Maintenance and Licensing, etc. interface correctly, taking into account the 
impact of issues within, and assumptions made by, each of the aspects as well as the 
practicalities and commercial viability of the final UAS solutions. 
Notwithstanding that regulations and standards can be developed or updated to 
incorporate UAS operations such that they are acceptably safe, there remain many issues 
with the practical implementation of technology to achieve the essential safety 
requirements.  The most relevant of these is the development of Sense and Avoid 
specifications that address the overarching safety requirements and can still be achieved in 
practice. 
Consideration should also be given to pursuing the regulatory aspects of Sense and Avoid 
systems and ensuring the UAS operations are considered in all current and future ATM 
research, particularly SESAR, which may alter the concepts or technologies deployed.  
However, regulators and industry (e.g. through Work Group 73 of EUROCAE) steps 
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towards providing the necessary UAS regulatory and standards infrastructure and 
specifications such as (EUROCONTROL UAV-TF, 2007) provide an important foundation.  
Wider and more detailed regulations and standards will likely form around the technologies 
that become available to resolve the operational and safety issues that UAS operations must 
address.   There is still much scope for further research in the area of UAS regulation and 
implementation and programmes such as the UK DTI funded ASTRAEA project will help 
significantly to move the process forward.   
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